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 Abstract 
Job search models offer two complementary predictions about the effects of 
unemployment benefits on job search outcomes among unemployed workers. By 
raising workers’ reservation wages, unemployment benefits should contribute to both 
prolonged spell duration and improved post-unemployment job quality. In contrast to 
many previous empirical studies that have addressed the negative benefit effect on 
duration only, the current paper jointly addresses the causal effect of unemployment 
benefits on both unemployment duration and post-unemployment wages. Based on 
panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the German 
Socio-Economic Panel for the 1980s and 1990s, the paper establishes empirical 
support for both benefit effects in both countries. If anything, there is evidence of a 
slightly more negative duration effect for the U.S. data, while positive UI effects on 
post-unemployment wages are stronger in the German data. In any event, the 
empirical estimates for the positive effects of unemployment benefits on wages 
substantially exceed those obtained in Addison and Blackburn’s recent paper based 
on Displaced Worker Survey data. In contrast to their findings, the data also provide 
ample evidence of stronger UI effects in the lower tails  of the wage change 
distribution. At the cost of a fairly small prolongation of unemployment duration, 
unemployment benefits thus substantially reduce the scar effects of unemployment 
on workers’ future job records. 
 
Keywords: Unemployment insurance, unemployment duration, wage change,  
  displaced workers, search theory 
JEL-Codes: J64, J65 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Suchtheorie macht zwei komplementäre Vorhersagen über den Einfluß der Ar-
beitslosenversicherung auf die Dynamik von Arbeitslosigkeit. Indem die Anspruchs-
löhne der Arbeitslosen erhöht werden, sollte die Arbeitslosenversicherung sowohl zu 
einer verlängerten Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer als auch zu einem verbesserten Matching 
bei Wiederbeschäftigung beitragen. Im Gegensatz zu anderen empirischen Studien, 
die nur den negativen Effekt der Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit betrachten, werden im 
vorliegenden DP beide Effekte empirisch untersucht. Auf der Basis des sozio-öko-
nomischen Panels sowie vergleichbarer Paneldaten des Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation können diese Effekte für beide Arbeitsmärkte empirisch nachge-
wiesen werden. Im Vergleich sind allenfalls die negativen Dauereffekte der Arbeitslo-
senversicherung in den USA etwas stärker, während in der Bundesrepublik die posi-
tiven Effekte auf die Qualität des Matchings vergleichsweise höher ausfallen. Die 
geschätzten positiven Lohneffekte wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Transfers liegen insgesamt 
höher als in der Studie von Addison und Blackburn, die auf Daten des Displaced 
Worker Survey basierte. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Studie lassen sich auch besonders 
starke Transfereffekte im unteren Bereich der Lohnveränderungsverteilung nachwei-
sen. Auf Kosten einer geringen Verlängerung der Dauer von Arbeitslosigkeit reduzie-
ren wohlfahrtsstaatliche Transferleistungen folglich die negativen Konsequenzen von 
Arbeitslosigkeit für den weiteren Erwerbsverlauf. 
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Introduction 
Recently, the microeconomics of unemployment has seen a remarkable shift in 
emphasis. Whereas the spread of transition data models and longitudinal data 
had spurred numerous studies of unemployment duration in the late 1980s and 
up to the mid-1990s (e.g. Devine and Kiefer 1991; Pedersen and Westergård -
Nielsen 1993; Machin and Manning 1999 for reviews), attention has 
increasingly turned towards the economic consequences of unemployment 
experiences since then. Recently, for example, the Economic Journal featured a 
series of articles (Arulampalam 2001; Gregory and Jukes 2001; Gregg 2001; cf. 
Arulampalam et al. 2001 for an introduction) that established substantial scar 
effects of unemployment, both of youth unemployment on adult unemployment 
(Gregg 2001), but also for unemployment experiences of prime-age workers on 
their future work careers. In contrast to popular assumptions among 
economists, these scar effects are far from transitory: Arulampalam (2001) e.g. 
gives an initial 6% wage penalty associated with unemployment, that 
perpetuates into a full 14% penalty over the first three years after leaving 
unemployment. Gregory and Jukes (2001) estimate a one-year spell of 
unemployment to imply a permanent wage penalty of 10%. Arulampalam (2001) 
in particular insists that much of the scarring occurs in workers’ first post-
unemployment jobs which is carried forward subsequently rather than being 
gradually eroded over time. Also, Nickell et al. (2002) recently stressed that 
wage penalties associated with unemployment have grown considerably over 
the past decades. While still limited in coverage of countries, different aspects 
of job outcomes, and stringent incorporation of changing macroeconomic 
conditions, these recent studies nevertheless do strongly suggest that 
unemployment experiences entail serious negative consequences for 
individuals’ further careers, and that negative effects of unemployment might be 
much more persistent than commonly perceived. 
 This shift in emphasis has in fact also prompted new perspectives on the 
effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment dynamics, or has at 
least contributed to revive interest in some long-neglected issues. It is 
particularly revealing that, while numerous studies had focused on establishing 
empirical evidence for predictions of negative UI effects on unemployment 
duration, there was and still is very little empirical research on positive UI effects 
on post-unemployment wages predicted by basic job search theory. In their 
recent survey, Addison and Blackburn (2000) cite only a handful of respective 
studies, and in fact, most of these date back to the late 1970s, and none had 
appeared since the mid-1980s.1 Given the increasing popularity of search 
models, the dearth of respective empirical research is ironic indeed: as Addison 
                                                 
1  Interestingly, there is a similarly renewed interest in the scar effects of unemployment, and the 
potential alleviating effects of the welfare state in recent empirical work in sociology (cf. Gallie and 
Paugam 2000). 
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and Blackburn (2000:22f.) correctly point out, a negative UI effect on 
unemployment duration can readily be derived from the simple static labor-
leisure framework, without any necessity to introduce search models, dynamics 
or the notion of a reservation wage at all. In fact, only empirical evidence on UI 
effects on post-unemployment wages (and job quality more generally) will allow 
to adjudicate whether UI simply lowers the opportunity cost of leisure or whether 
UI is better seen as lowering the opportunity cost of job search, which might 
even increase the efficiency of matching in the labor market. 
 Along these lines, Addison and Blackburn (2000) offered empirical 
evidence on UI effects on post-unemployment wages based on data from the 
1983-1990 Displaced Worker Surveys. In their analyses, they actually obtained 
some support for positive UI effects on wages, although the implied magnitudes 
of the effects were typically small and often statistically insignificant. More 
recently, Belzil (2000) has conducted a related analysis of a large Canadian 
administrative database, and found only small positive UI effects on post-
unemployment job duration. Against this background, the current paper extends 
these analyses by presenting empirical evidence on UI effects based on more 
recent 1984-1995 data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
Moreover, the paper offers complementary evidence from UI effects in the West 
German labor market based on the German Socio-Economic Panel study. Like 
Belzil (2000), yet in contrast to Addison and Blackburn (2000), I will be using a 
particular variant of hazard rate modeling that allows for joint estimation of the 
causal effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration and post-
unemployment wages. In contrast to both recent studies, however, I establish a 
sizeable positive UI effect on post-unemployment wages in both the U.S. and 
the West German data. 
1. Benefit effects on unemployment dynamics: a brief survey 
The relationship between unemployment insurance and labor market dynamics 
has since long been one of the key issues in modern labor economics, and 
considerable work has been devoted to clarifying the respective mechanisms at 
work. Job search models have typically been the work horse in such endeavors, 
and many of the models’ predictions precisely relate to the effects of 
unemployment benefits, or more accurately non-earned income while 
unemployed. The basic theory is conventional by now, and there is little need to 
give an extended account here (cf. the surveys by Mortensen 1986 and Devine 
and Kiefer 1991; Lippman and McCall 1976a, 1976b). Basically, job search 
theory represents the job-finding process as a sequential decision process, with 
job offers randomly arriving and workers having to sequentially decide whether 
to accept the current offer or to continue job search. According to dynamic 
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programming theory, the optimal search strategy in such contexts is to form a 
reservation wage as the minimum acceptable wage offer, taking into account 
features of the labor market environment like job offer arrival rate, the wage 
distribution, but also available non-earned income and the disutility of work. 
Having chosen the reservation wage, workers’ best strategy is to hold fast for 
the first offer that exceeds the reservation wage, to accept this offer, yet decline 
all lower ones received at earlier stages in the job search process. 
 In the simplest environment of a stationary wage distribution, an infinite 
time horizon, and inexhaustible unemployment benefits (strictly speaking: non-
decreasing non-earned income net of out-of-pocket search costs), the basic job 
search model yields the constant reservation wage wr that satisfies the 
condition 
 
(1) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] rwwwwEwFvbw rrrr /|1 ->-=+- d  , 
 
where b gives non-earned income, v the value of leisure, ä the job offer arrival 
rate, r workers’ discount rate, and F(.) the cumulative wage distribution (cf. 
Mortensen 1986; Devine and Kiefer 1991). With respect to the role of non-
earned income b, total differentiation yields the standard result 
 
(2) ( )[ ] 01// >-+=¶¶ rr wFrrbw  , 
 
predicting workers’ reservation wages to increase with increasing levels of 
available income while not working. As unemployment benefits are assumed to 
raise b for the average worker over the alternative income stream provided by 
having to rely on family resources and general assistance schemes only, most 
observers agree on seeing the rise in reservation wages as the main 
mechanism behind any effects of unemployment insurance on wages (see 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1991 for a discussion o f alternative channels, 
however). Hence, a most important implication of search theory is the prediction 
that higher levels of non-earned income (= unemployment benefits) should 
translate into more favorable post-unemployment wages, and thus smaller scar 
effects of unemployment. From this starting point, however, most studies are 
then quick (and correct) to point out that higher reservation wages imply longer 
spell duration of unemployment, as higher reservation wages imply higher 
rejection rates of incoming job offers. Indeed, the basic job search model 
implies the negative relation 
 
(3) ( ) ( ) 0// <+-=¶¶ tdt rwfrb r  , 
 
between job exit rates ô and non-earned income b, so that higher income levels 
during unemployment spells should prolong unemployment duration. 
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 In sum, job search theory thus offers two complementary predictions on 
the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on job search outcomes (cf. 
Mortensen 1986, 1990; Lippman and McCall 1976a, 1976b; Burdett 1979; 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1991 have a critical discussion of the literature). In 
essence, the job search argument is that by raising worker reservation wages, 
unemployment benefits contribute to both prolonged spell duration and 
improved post-unemployment wages. As Addison and Blackburn (2000:23) in a 
recent paper correctly note, it is the latter prediction that sharply distinguishes 
the job search interpretation of UI effects from the standard static labor-leisure 
model. Whereas both models agree in the prediction of negative UI effects on 
unemployment duration, both models clearly diverge in terms of the alleged 
source of the effect. To the standard model, the negative UI effect results from 
the disutility of work, and UI payments thus subsidizing leisure. In the dynamic 
job search model, however, the negative UI effects on duration are not seen as 
arising from the disutility of work, but from UI benefits lowering the opportunity 
cost of job search, which by reducing current constraints on search behavior 
allows workers to trade off some prolongation of current job search (i.e. 
unemployment) for improved job matches that imply higher utility levels in the 
longer run. To the extent that both negative UI effects on duration and positive 
UI effects on post-unemployment wages could be established, this evidence 
would sustain Burdett’s (1979) predicament of UI acting as a search subsidy 
rather than a static work disincentive. 
Empirical studies 
Against this background, it is in fact surprising to see the bulk of empirical 
studies focusing on establishing UI effects on unemployment duration. 
Effectively, most empirical studies seem to conform to expectations, and 
establish negative effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment 
duration (e.g. the reviews in Devine and Kiefer 1991; Pedersen and 
Westergård -Nielsen 1993; Holmlund 1998; Machin and Manning 1999). By now, 
robust evidence on UI duration effects has been obtained for a number of 
countries over the past decades, covering the U.S. (e.g. Meyer 1990; Katz and 
Meyer 1990a, 1990b; Fallick 1991), but also Canada (e.g. Belzil 2000) and 
European labor markets (e.g. Hunt 1995; Hujer and Schneider 1996; Steiner 
1997 for Germany; Carling et al. 2001 for Sweden, or Narendranathan et al. 
1985; Narendranathan 1993; Arulampalam et al. 1995 for UK data). However, it 
seems to be the case that UI effects on duration are typically fairly small in 
magnitude, except among particular sub-populations like male youth during the 
school-to-work transition (e.g. Narendranathan 1993). Also, some studies have 
suggested stronger UI effects from UI eligibility rather than the level of UI 
replacement rates (e.g. Steiner 1997) – although it might be argued here that 
this result merely reflects the larger variation in non-earned income b inherent in 
comparing UI recipients to non-recipients relative to the often (especially in 
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Europe) fairly small cross-sectional variation in actual UI replacement rates. 
What is important here, however, is the fact that numerous earlier econometric 
studies almost unequivocally point to some negative UI effect on unemployment 
duration. Yet as argued above, only an analysis of UI wage effects will be able 
to tell whether this effect results from UI inducing work disincentives (no wage 
effects) or from UI subsidizing job search (associated with positive wage 
effects) and protecting workers’ stock of human capital acquired throughout 
their previous work histories. 
 Unfortunately, there are few econometric studies to date actually 
evaluating benefit effects on post-unemployment wages. Cox and Oaxaca 
(1990), Burtless (1990), and more recently Addison and Blackburn (2000) have 
surveyed the scant evidence available, and Addison and Blackburn (2000:22) in 
particular have noted the mixed empirical evidence on positive UI effects on 
wages that is “varied enough in their approach and conclusions that 
experienced observers can reach very different interpretations to [the] findings.” 
Addison and Blackburn (2000) then continue to provide their own analyses of UI 
effects on post-unemployment wages based on Displaced Worker Survey 
(DWS) data, and conclude that some small positive UI effects on wages might 
exist, although the evidence does not appear to be statistically robust and the 
effects are assessed as substantively rather small. Closer inspection of their 
results suggests, however, that their relatively negative predicament is mainly 
based on their analyses of replacement rate effects among UI recipients that 
indeed yield little evidence of any positive effects on wages. In their analyses 
comparing UI recipients to non-recipients, however, Addison and Blackburn in 
fact obtain a positive UI effect on post-unemployment earnings in the order of 
2%-5% of workers’ pre-unemployment earnings levels, which they consider as 
sizeable themselves (2000:38). Also, they obtain some (weak) evidence of 
somewhat larger positive UI effects among a sub-sample of more experienced 
workers, and in the lower tail of the wage change distribution – both features 
which would seem to fit favorably with the standard search account of UI effects 
on unemployment dynamics. 
 Other than this study by Addison and Blackburn, there is very little recent 
empirical work on UI effects on post-unemployment job outcomes. To the best 
of my knowledge, there is only one closely related study by Belzil (2000), who 
addresses UI effects on post-unemployment job stability for a register-based 
sample of Canadian displaced workers receiving unemployment insurance. 
Even more clearly than Addison and Blackburn, Belzil (2000) claims evidence of 
only very small positive UI effects on job stability. His analyses show that a 
considerable part of UI effects in his models is accounted for by unobserved 
heterogeneity between workers, so that his preferred estimates of actual UI 
effects lie in the order of an increase in expected job duration by about 0.5-0.9 
days per additional week of benefit duration. 
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2. Data and econometric methodology 
Against these rather negative findings and assessments of UI benefits on 
unemployment dynamics, the current paper will provide some new analyses 
based on both new data, somewhat different methodologies, and covering 
German in addition to U.S. data. Basically, the analytical purpose behind this 
cross-country study is to use the cross-national comparison as a particular kind 
of sensitivity analysis that allows to assess the robustness of findings across 
institutionally and structurally distinct national labor markets. Any U.S.-German 
comparison indeed provides a veritable array of such differences, be it in terms 
of the dynamics of labor markets (Schettkat 1992; Garibaldi et al. 1997), the 
extent of labor market regulation (Grubb and Wells 1993; Abraham and 
Houseman 1993; OECD 1999), the structure of education and training systems 
(Müller and Shavit 1998), or the extent of welfare state compensation of income 
losses (Esping-Andersen 1990; Mitchell 1991). In terms of the latter, Germany 
as well as many other Continental European countries offers a much more 
extensive protection against life-course risks like unemployment, ill health, 
family disruption or old age than is common in the United States. The structure 
of unemployment insurance is in fact a quite instructive example about the 
nature of such institutional differences. While UI benefit replacement ratios 
actually differ relatively little between the United States and Germany 
(Schömann et al. 2000; Schmid and Reissert 1996; Esping-Andersen 1990), it 
is benefit eligibility criteria that are considerably stiffer within the U.S. UI system 
(Grubb 2000). In consequence, actual UI benefit coverage rates among 
unemployed workers are considerably lower in the United States as compared 
to the more universal benefit coverage for German prime-age workers (Schmid 
and Reissert 1996).2 German unemployment insurance is thus not necessarily 
more generous in terms of genuine transfer amounts, yet much more 
encompassing in terms of worker eligibility for unemployment benefits. 
Data sources 
The current analyses will be based on employment history data drawn from the 
U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1991) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP; cf. Wagner et 
al. 1994; DIW 1999) study. Both studies are household panel surveys 
representative of each country’s residential population, and both surveys 
provide rich databases on individual labor market behavior, employment, 
                                                 
2  Calculated from cross-sectional samples of unemployed workers, Schmid and Reissert (1996:244f.) 
give UI coverage rates between 70-80% for West Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s. Based on 
data for the mid-1990s, Schömann et al. (2000: Appendix 1) arrive at UI coverage rate estimates of 
40% in the U.S., and 74% for the unified Germany. As these data are based on cross-sectional samples 
of unemployed workers, the figures will tend to underestimate coverage rates among an inflow sample 
from employment into unemployment, as will be used in this analysis. 
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unemployment and job dynamics. Although sharing largely similar interests, 
both surveys to some extent differ in terms study design. In particular, while the 
GSOEP design very much follows the design chosen in the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) in combining annual interval lengths between 
interviews with extensive retrospective information on both individual life 
courses and calendar information on labor market events in the year preceding 
the interview, the SIPP is based on much shorter four -month intervals between 
interviews. Also, single SIPP panels have been discontinued after eight to ten 
interviews, whereas the GSOEP sample (including some sample refreshments) 
has been continuously followed since its original start in 1984. Against these 
differences in study design, however, both surveys are likely to represent the 
most appropriate data sources on (short-run) labor market and unemployment 
dynamics in both countries (cf. also Witte 1989). 
For the purpose of this paper, harmonized data from the combined SIPP 
Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993, and the West German data 
from GSOEP waves A-M (samples A+B) has been used to generate monthly 
calendar information in the 12-year observation window between January 1984 
and December 1995. To address the effects of UI benefits on unemployment 
dynamics in the two countries, the subsequent analyses use an inflow sample 
of all unemployment spells among displaced workers that were begun during 
this observation period. Throughout this paper, displaced workers are defined 
rather liberally as workers having entered unemployment from dependent 
employment immediately preceding an unemployment spell.3 Hence, the spell 
sample drawn here excludes any unemployment spells of both first-time 
entrants to the labor force, but also job search periods of (mostly) women 
returning to the labor market after career interruptions. The intention behind 
restricting the analysis to the core work force highly attached to the labor market 
is to evaluate the effects of UI benefits precisely with respect to those events 
that UI benefits have been primarily designed to compensate for, namely job 
losses. 
 Under these restrictions, the combined SIPP data yield a sample of 
24,100 unemployment spells of 21,551 workers that are observed for a total of 
98,749 observation months. The smaller GSOEP database still gives a total of 
3,251 unemployment spells of 2,264 workers that are observed for a total of 
32,498 months. Rates of right-censoring are 17.7% (4,254 spells) in the SIPP, 
and 11.9% (387 spells) in the GSOEP data. As the spell samples have been 
drawn conditional on pre-unemployment status, the samples used here by 
definition exclude any left-censored or left–truncated spells. Added to the core 
                                                 
3  In technical terms, any unemployment spell has been sampled from the two databases if individuals 
reported to have worked at least up to three months before the start of an unemployment spell. This 
maximum inactivity gap of two months has been allowed for in order to minimize the impact of late 
benefit take-up or workers’ recall expectations that might result in reporting some time of inactivity 
rather than active job search behavior. 
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spell information, the databases include gender, age, ethnicity, workers’ 
education (including completion of vocational training in the German sample), 
labor force experience, tenure, occupation, industry, earnings and wages with 
previous employer as main worker-level characteristics, but also a measure of 
the quarterly vacancy ratio calculated by the quarterly number of hires over the 
average number of unemployed in any given quarter as an indicator of 
aggregate labor market dynamics. All earnings and wage data are deflated to 
1990 U.S. prices, with German earnings and wage data being adjusted by 1990 
purchasing power parities after deflation. Unemployment benefit status is 
measured time-constant, with benefit receipt being recorded if workers reported 
receiving UI transfers in any month of the unemployment spell. Compared to 
properly accounting for the effects of late benefit take-up, temporary benefit 
disqualification or simple measurement errors, this appeared as the much more 
robust measure, especially for the purposes of cross-national comparison. The 
distribution of covariates in the two samples is given in full in Appendix 1.4 
Econometric modeling 
For this spell dataset, two main outcome measures of interest have been 
recorded: whether exiting unemployment has occurred by taking up a new job, 
and if so, the wage level of the job entered. The resulting duration data is most 
conveniently analyzed in a hazard rate framework (e.g. Lancaster 1990; Kiefer 
1988; Neumann 1999; Petersen 1995). In line with search theory concerns, the 
subsequent analyses will primarily address the hazard rate of leaving 
unemployment into employment as the key dependent variable describing 
unemployment duration. In this framework, this hazard rate r(t) is defined as 
 
(4) 
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representing individuals’ instantaneous propensity to leave unemployment at 
spell time t, conditional on the fact that no such event has taken place up to 
spell time t. As the following analyses will apply a discrete -time approach based 
on monthly spell data (cf. Allison 1982; Meyer 1990), equation (1) becomes the 
probability of exiting unemployment for paid work within the next monthly 
interval t+1, given that workers have stayed in unemployment until spell time t. 
Also, basic econometric theory on rate models tells that knowledge of r(t) is 
sufficient to deduce several alternative representations of the unemployment 
duration distribution, including the duration distribution f(t) itself, but more 
importantly also the cumulative duration distribution F(t) and the survivor 
function G(t) = 1-F(t) (Lancaster 1990).5 
                                                 
4  All tables and figures in the appendix page I-X 
5  Note at this stage, however, that the following analyses will not address the unemployment duration 
distribution strictly speaking, as I will refrain from incorporating flows between unemployment and 
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 Modeling duration distributions in terms of hazard rates rather than any 
other equivalent distribution offers the advantage of easy incorporation of 
censored cases, i.e. ongoing spells of unemployment by the end of the 
observation window. Also, if destination states differ in terms of quality, such 
qualitatively different transitions are straightforward to address in competing-
risks frameworks that include several separately estimated rate equations. As 
this paper is concerned with both reemployment rates and post-unemployment 
wage levels, the subsequent analyses will use a particular competing-risks 
specification originally developed by Heckman and Singer (1984) and first 
applied in Petersen’s (1988, 1995) analyses of status attainment processes. 
More specifically, Petersen (1988, 1995: 500f.) decomposes the destination-
specific hazard rates rk(t) into 
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )tTkDtrtrk ==´º ,Pr  , 
 
i.e. the product of the overall exit rate r(t) and a destination equation predicting 
the type of exit k (which might e.g. contrast entering jobs associated with wage 
losses versus jobs associated with no wage loss). More importantly, Petersen’s 
competing-risks formulation is readily generalized to continuous state space 
settings (cf. Petersen 1988), i.e. continuous measures of wage levels or other 
aspects of job quality outcomes. In this case, equation (5) is straightforward to 
extend into 
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( )tTygtrtrk =´º | ,  
 
where job quality y is measured continuously (Petersen 1988:144). In sum, 
equations (5) and (6) thus describe a basic, yet quite general and flexible 
econometric framework to jointly address UI effects on reemployment rates and 
discrete (equation 5) or continuously measured wage outcomes (equation 6). 
 In contrast to Petersen’s original paper that presented a two-step limited-
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator of equations (5) and (6), the 
current paper will implement full-information maximum likelihood estimators 
(FIML) for these particular competing-risks specifications. Most importantly, 
conditional on functional form assumptions, the FIML approach developed 
below allows to test for conditional independence between reemployment rates 
and wage outcomes, while this assumption has been implicit in Petersen’s 
original LIML estimator. Also, being able to avoid imposing an independence 
assumption seems indispensable on theoretical grounds, given that job search 
models clearly imply the prediction of truncation from below in the distribution of 
accepted wages (equivalent to positive correlation between exit rates and post-
unemployment wage levels). In the following, I apply FIML estimators of both (5) 
and (6), as both continuous and discrete measures of wage outcomes will be 
                                                                                                                                               
inactivity but rather focus on reemployment rates r(t) only. Implicitly, of course, this assumes 
conditional independence between U-E and U-N transition rates. 
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defined in order to address UI effects on different aspects of the post-
unemployment wage distribution. In addition to a standard measure of real 
wage change between pre- and post-unemployment jobs, the paper will also 
consider discrete measures at different cut-off points in the distribution: given 
that search models argue about truncation of wage distributions being the main 
mechanism behind benefit effects, subsequent empirical analyses will address 
whether UI effects on wages increase in the lower tail of the wage change 
distribution, i.e. if UI benefits are particularly effective in preventing (severe) 
wage losses upon reemployment. To that end, empirical results that look at UI 
effects on the probability of wage losses of various degrees will be presented 
below. 
 Assuming joint normality of the latent rate index function and the latent 
index function underlying the probability of a certain wage change, the FIML 
estimator in question then becomes a particular variant of a bivariate probit 
specification of the model. Using Ö to represent the standard cumulative normal 
distribution, Ö2 to represent the cumulative bivariate normal distribution, and äwk 
indexing the occurrence of a work exit into jobs of quality k, this results in  
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as the log-likelihood function of the model. In this particular setting, the 
parameter vector âw reflects the effects of covariates xw on workers’ 
reemployment rates, whereas the second parameter vector âk represents the 
effects of covariates xk on the conditional probability of exiting into jobs of type 
k=1 instead of jobs of type k=0. Moreover, the parameter ñwk reflects any 
potential correlation between wage levels k and job exit rates r. If wage 
outcomes are measured continuously instead, the appropriate log-likelihood 
function becomes 
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which is merely a non-standard application of Heckman’s selectivity correction 
estimator (Heckman 1979). In any event, and very much as in more standard 
analyses, the covariate vectors xw and xk will include measures of workers’ skills 
(education, experience, tenure and earnings in previous job, as well as 
completion of vocational training for German workers) as well as gender and 
information on non-white, respectively non-German ethnicity. Duration 
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dependence is accounted for by including a third-order polynomial function in 
both equations. Additional control variables for the rate equation include 
occupation and industry dummies, a measure of the quarterly aggregate 
vacancy ratio, year dummies as well as a ‘seam’ month variable intended to 
capture the effects of linking several interview waves into a single event history 
calendar.6 Excluding these variables from the wage equations effectively also 
serves as an identification restriction o f the model. The core variable of interest 
to the current paper is of course the effect of individual UI benefit status on both 
reemployment rates and post-unemployment wages. In order to allow for the 
possibility of “selection on unobservables” into UI, the analyses will further 
include the Inverse Mills’ Ratio from a first-stage probit model of UI benefit 
status. The respective estimation results are given in Appendix 2.7 But before 
turning to discuss the results from these more involved event history models, 
the following section will first give some core descriptive information on 
unemployment dynamics in the United States and West Germany. 
 
3. Unemployment duration and wage outcomes in the United States 
and West Germay 
At fairly comparable levels of aggregate unemployment rates during the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, the flows underlying aggregate unemployment have 
differed considerably between the United States and West Germany (cf. 
Garibaldi et al. 1997; Machin and Manning 1999). As immediately evident from 
Table 1 below, unemployment duration figures among German workers have 
well exceeded comparable U.S. figures throughout the period under study. 
Typically, median spell durations in the German labor market have been about 
twice the figures common among U.S. workers. Averaging over the 1984-1995 
period, median unemployment spell duration has been 2.3 months among U.S. 
workers, yet amounted to a full 4.8 months among unemployed workers in West 
Germany. Also, as shown by further disaggregation, while unemployment 
duration figures have evolved pro-cyclically in both countries, German duration 
figures have risen particularly strongly during the recession of the mid-1990s. 
                                                 
6  The ‘seam’ month is the final month of calendar information gained within any single interview. 
Several papers on both the SIPP and the GSOEP report artificially increased transition rates in these 
months as individuals having experienced a certain event during the recall period of the subsequent 
interview are more likely to date the event back to the start of the recall period. 
7  Empirically it turns out that there is little evidence of important selection on unobservables, as UI 
benefit effect estimates are substantively robust to the inclusion of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio (respective 
results are available from the author on request). This indicates that readily observable worker 
characteristics are suitable predictors for UI eligibility, so that concerns for self-selection are much 
less of an issue than e.g. in the case of evaluations of training programs. Of course, this is precisely 
what would be expected from both the nature of unemployment insurance and the institutional 
regulations concerning UI eligibility.  
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Unsurprisingly, differences in reemployment rates are the key component 
behind these cross-national differences in unemployment duration. In both the 
United States and West Germany, some 70% of all exits from unemployment 
are into dependent employment. Only relatively few unemployed workers start 
up their own businesses, a certain proportion of workers facing difficulties in 
securing reemployment enter training courses or educational programs, and a 
sizeable minority of workers is - at least intermittently - withdrawing from the 
work force. Interestingly enough, there is also considerable cross-country 
similarity in wage change distributions. In both countries, wage change 
distributions are highly skewed showing average real wage gains for 
unemployed workers, yet the median worker experiences reemployment at real 
wages similar to those in her earlier job. A considerable proportion of workers 
has to face real wage losses, however, which are quite substantial (>20%) for 
about one quarter to one fifth of all unemployed workers.89 
 
Disaggregating these figures by individual UI benefit status provides first 
descriptive evidence on the potential role of UI in accounting for the above 
findings on unemployment dynamics. There are two relevant pieces of evidence 
here: first of all, the bottom row of Table 2 clearly shows the expected and 
substantial differences in UI coverage between Germany and the U.S. While 
empirically almost 90% of unemployed workers in the German sample have had 
access to UI benefits, the respective U.S. figure has been as low as 39%. And 
secondly, there is also some evidence of differences in unemployment behavior 
between covered and non-covered workers in both countries. At a purely 
descriptive level, workers receiving UI benefits tend to experience longer 
durations of unemployment spells, yet at least in Germany, also show 
somewhat more favorable wage outcomes than workers not eligible to receive 
benefits. Moreover, the differences between these two groups of unemployed 
workers are far from trivial empirically. The median spell duration among 
workers covered by UI benefits in the U.S. is about 1.5 months longer than 
among workers without access to UI benefits, and the respective differential 
among German unemployed amounts to even more than two months. At the 
same time, workers covered by UI benefits in both countries are somewhat 
more likely to exit unemployment by taking up paid work rather than by – at 
least intermittently – withdrawing from the labor market. Conditional on leaving 
unemployment for work, workers who had received UI benefits during their 
unemployment spell in Germany also tend to show more favorable wage 
                                                 
8  Note however, that the wage change measure applied here is a less than ideal measure of scar effects 
proper which would ideally be assessed against the expected wage from continued employment in 
workers’ previous job. In particular, if seniority gradients are steeper in the U.S. labor market, the 
observations made here are fully consistent with the standard result of smaller scar effects in Germany 
(e.g. Burda and Mertens 2001). While imperfect, the available wage measure still allows to identify 
the causal effect of UI benefits on post-unemployment wages, however. 
9  All tables and figures in the appendix page I - X 
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outcomes, in particular in terms of avoiding fairly sizable real wage losses. 
Among covered workers in Germany, the probability of experiencing a 10% real 
wage cut is some 5 percentage points below the corresponding figure among 
non-covered workers, and in the case of 20% real wage cuts, the differential 
amounts to even 8 percentage points. In contrast, U.S. figures do not reveal 
similarly positive effects of unemployment benefit receipt. 
As none of these results has been adjusted for group differences in worker 
characteristics, the above estimates of course provide only a naïve estimate of 
actual treatment effects. Given the structure of UI eligibility requirements, it is 
eventually unsurprising to find workers covered by UI exhibiting higher levels of 
pre-unemployment work experience, higher levels of tenure with former 
employers, and higher pre-unemployment wages and earnings (cf. Appendix 1). 
To the extent that any of these worker characteristics affect unemployment 
processes, systematic group differences between covered and non-covered 
workers in terms of background characteristics will naturally bias any causal 
inferences based on simple descriptive statistics. To discuss UI benefit effects 
on job histories in a more appropriate econometric framework, I now turn to 
estimation results obtained for the discrete -time hazard rate models that have 
been developed in Section 2 above. 
Unemployment benefits and unemployment dynamics: hazard rate models 
Tables 2 and 3 have the estimation results from a series of discrete-time 
bivariate probit hazard models that simultaneously address job exit rates and 
post-unemployment wages among U.S. and West German workers. For each 
country, six different models have been estimated, each addressing a specific 
aspect of the post-unemployment wage distribution. These models control for a 
wide range of covariates, including worker characteristics like gender, ethnicity, 
education and labor force experience, but also aggregate vacancy ratios and 
potential trends in workers’ reemployment rates. As these covariates primarily 
serve as control variables in the context of this paper, the respective estimation 
results will be summarized only briefly here. Also, the results obtained for these 
variables are mostly standard in the empirical literature (Pedersen and 
Westergård -Nielsen 1993; Devine and Kiefer 1991; Machin and Manning 1999). 
In general, reemployment rates are found to exhibit negative duration 
dependence, i.e. reemployment rates tend to fall over the course of 
unemployment spells. In terms of macroeconomic effects, reemployment rates 
are also positively related to aggregate labor market dynamics as captured by 
quarterly vacancy ratios, and relatively more so among German workers. At the 
individual level, education, labor force experience, previous earnings levels and 
vocational training among German workers all contribute to higher rates of 
reemployment, while tenure with workers’ previous employer tends to lower 
workers’ chances to find new jobs. Also, women and non-white, respectively 
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non-German workers face lower reemployment rates in both countries (results 
not shown).  
At the same time, these covariates are also found to affect post-
unemployment wages. Most importantly, higher pre-unemployment wages imply 
higher risks of experiencing post-unemployment wage losses among both U.S. 
and German workers. Effectively, this finding implies that some important part of 
workers’ earnings capacity does carry over to workers’ new jobs, yet the fraction 
of workers’ earnings capacity that is carried over apparently declines with pre-
unemployment wage levels. There is also some evidence of a negative 
relationship between labor market conditions and post-unemployment wages, 
i.e. unemployed workers tend to experience higher wage losses when there are 
plenty of vacancies. This finding might come somewhat unexpectedly, yet it 
might simply testify workers’ willingness to accept reemployment at lower 
wages as long as they face a reasonable chance that the deterioration in 
earnings capacity will be short-lived. Apart from these effects, there is little 
consistent evidence on further covariate effects, be it in terms of duration 
dependence or skills. It seems noticeable, however, that all estimated models 
provide support of a strongly negative structural relation between work exit rates 
on the one hand, and job quality on the other: job finding rates tend to increase 
as workers’ relative real wage levels fall. This observation is noticeable insofar 
as job search models would imply a positive correlation resulting from a 
truncation from below in the distribution of accepted wage offers. Rather to the 
contrary, and more consistent with dual labor market theories and segmentation 
models, the empirical evidence points to dominant rationing effects in the 
primary, high-skill, high-wage sectors of the economy. 
 
 More importantly, however, the estimation results of Tables 2 and 3 also 
provide unequivocal empirical support for both key effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment dynamics. Across all different specifications of the 
post-unemployment wage distributions, but also if compared across countries, 
the hazard rate estimates consistently establish a substantial and statistically 
significant negative effect of UI benefits on reemployment rates among 
unemployed workers. At the same time, however, UI benefits clearly tend to 
raise post-unemployment wages, and in particular tend to limit workers’ risks of 
incurring considerable wage losses upon reemployment. Hence, receiving UI 
benefits tends to both lower job-finding rates among unemployed workers and, 
at the same time, raises the quality of jobs taken on by workers leaving 
unemployment. Against some prolongation of unemployment spells, UI benefits 
thus significantly reduce potential scar effects of unemployment, at least in 
terms of workers’ post-unemployment wages. Basically, this conclusion also 
seems to be robust in the cross-national comparison between the U.S. and the 
West German labor market. Even though the evaluation of causal UI effects is 
more involved in the latter case due to both the considerably smaller sample 
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sizes available in the GSOEP and the more encompassing UI coverage among 
German workers, the results for UI benefit effects in the GSOEP data are 
remarkably consistent with those established from the SIPP sources. Again, UI 
benefits imply lower reemployment rates among unemployed workers, although 
the magnitude of the difference tends to be smaller than established from the 
U.S. data. In addition, there is also consistent evidence on positive UI effects on 
post-unemployment wages; if anything, these effects appear even larger than 
those established with the U.S. data, however. 
 Given the non-linear nature of the probit model, the implied magnitudes 
of UI effects are in fact more easily assessed from the marginal benefit effect 
estimates given in Table 4. As evident from these results, the implied 
magnitudes of UI effects are far from trivial empirically. To illustrate these, Table 
4 contains information on marginal UI benefit effects calculated at four different 
points of elapsed spell duration (T=1, 3, 6, and 12 months). Among the different 
quantities provided, benefit effects on r(t) and F(t) obviously describe the 
negative impact of UI benefits on unemployment duration. Among both U.S. and 
German workers, unemployment benefits tend to reduce job finding rates r(t) 
among the unemployed, which in consequence also implies lower cumulated 
probabilities F(t) of work exits from unemployment. Apparently, UI effects on 
unemployment duration are considerably stronger in the U.S. labor market. UI 
benefits are estimated to lower work exit rates by some 7 percentage points at 
the beginning of unemployment spells, which is equivalent to a full 30% 
reduction in outflow rates absent UI benefit coverage. Naturally, this effect 
translates into respective reductions in the cumulated probability F(t) of having 
exited unemployment by taking up paid work. According to the model estimates, 
UI benefit effects imply reductions in F(t) of some 13-15 percentage points by 
spell months 3 to 6 (equivalent to some 20-25% reduction in F(t)). The 
comparable German estimates are smaller in magnitudes, with UI benefits 
lowering work exit rates r(t) by about 2.7 percentage points. As reemployment 
rates are generally much lower in the German labor market, this amounts to 
reducing exit rates by about 23%, which leads to lowering F(t) by 6-9 
percentage points by spell months 3 to 6 (equaling a 20% reduction in F(t)). 
 
 These negative effects of UI benefits on reemployment rates are of 
course to be set against positive UI effects on post-unemployment wages. As 
described earlier, UI benefits tend to raise post-unemployment wages, and in 
particular consistently lower the probability of experiencing wage losses at 
exiting unemployment. Evaluating the distribution of accepted wages at T=12 
months, i.e. when most workers will already have left unemployment, the 
implied benefit effects on wages are substantial indeed. Among U.S. workers, 
benefits on average tend to raise post-unemployment wages by 5.3% of 
workers pre-unemployment real wage levels. In fact, this estimate accords quite 
well with the most comparable estimate obtained in Addison and Blackburn’s 
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(2000: Table 4, specification 4) recent paper, yet based on different data 
sources and a somewhat different econometric approach. Moreover, positive UI 
effects moreover become more pronounced, the more attention focuses on the 
lower tail of the wage change distribution, i.e. workers’ risks of experiencing  
(severe) wage losses. Across the different cut-points in the wage distribution, 
benefits tend to reduce the probability of experiencing a given wage loss by 4-6 
percentage points. Given a falling risk of experiencing more severe wage 
losses, this is of course equivalent to an increasingly stronger protection from 
more severe wage losses. Proportional to the baseline, benefits lower the risk of 
any post-unemployment real wage loss by 10%, yet the risk of wage cuts of 
30% and more by already more than 20%. If anything, these positive UI effects 
are even stronger among West German workers. On average, the GSOEP data 
even yield an estimated +9.3% increase in workers’ post-unemployment real 
wage levels. Again, UI effects are particularly strong if it comes to avoiding 
relatively severe wage cuts. While the probability of experiencing any real wage 
loss is reduced by 11 percentage points (a proportional risk reduction of about 
18%), the likelihood of experiencing wage cuts of at least 10% is lowered by 19 
percentage points, and the one for experiencing a 20% wage loss by still a full 
14 percentage points. Access to UI benefits in sum achieves a full 40% 
reduction in workers’ risks of experiencing severe wage losses among German 
workers. 
Benefit effects over spell duration and pre-unemployment earnings levels 
This evidence of considerable UI effects on both reemployment rates and post-
unemployment wages immediately begs further questions. Of many potential 
concerns, two particular issues will be taken up here. The first of these relates 
to the relationship between UI effects and spell duration, which embeds 
concerns like whether UI benefits contribute to perpetuate long-term 
unemployment as the long-term unemployed may fail to properly adjust wage 
expectations downward. This may even be reinforced if workers accurately 
perceive UI as a search subsidy leading to more adequate wage outcomes, yet 
if these positive UI effects wear off with increasing spell duration. Crosscutting 
this issue of changing UI effects over spell duration is the nature of the trade-off 
between prolonged search and improved wage outcomes in different skill 
groups in the labor market. While the models fitted above might yield the 
expected trade-off relationship in the aggregate sample, this is in itself no 
guarantee that this trade-off holds to similar degrees among both low- and high-
wage workers. In fact, it well be that UI acts as a search subsidy among high-
wage workers who have human capital to preserve through unemployment 
periods, while pure disincentive effects prevail at the level of low-wage earners. 
Sustaining the human capital interpretation of the UI effects at any rate requires 
that UI effects increase among high-wage workers: if anywhere, it is among 
high-skill workers that UI should unfold its positive effects on wages, and it is 
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also conceivable that search for adequate reemployment should take relatively 
more time in the high-skill segment. 
 
 To address both issues, it is necessary to augment the hazard rate 
models fitted before by including interaction terms between benefits and spell 
duration, respectively benefits and pre-unemployment earnings levels. These 
interaction terms have been included in both the rate and the wage equations of 
the hazard models, and three different models have been fitted subsequently 
(with wage change, any wage loss, and wage losses > 20% as the dependent 
variables in the wage equation). The empirical estimates for these extended 
models are reported in Table 5 for both countries, with the reported parameter 
estimates being restricted to the additional interaction terms in the models. For 
all models, likelihood-ratio tests indicate a statistically significant improvement in 
model fit by including these interaction terms, although the evidence for the 
smaller GSOEP database seems less robust than for the U.S. data. Despite 
imprecise point estimates in the German data and against the resulting 
reservations about the latter, the results appear mutually consistent in 
substantive terms for both the U.S. and the West German data, however. For 
both samples, the parameter estimates show that both negative UI effects on 
reemployment rates and positive effects on post-unemployment wages decline 
with spell duration. In turn, and very much in line with the notion of human 
capital preservation, UI effects increase with pre-unemployment earnings. 
 
 The implied effect magnitudes are again more easily assessed from 
transforming the probit parameters back into the underlying quantities of the 
models. Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical illustration of the relationships 
between marginal benefit effects and spell duration, respectively pre-
unemployment earnings. Given that the estimation results are very consistent 
across different specifications of wage outcomes, both figures illustrate the 
structure of the interactions for the wage loss model only. With the exception of 
the model for severe wage losses in Germany, the resulting patterns are 
qualitatively very similar for the other specifications; the detailed results are of 
course available from the author on request. Returning to the figures 
themselves, Figure 1 first clearly shows that whatever effects UI unfolds on 
unemployment dynamics, these are confined to about the first nine to twelve 
months in unemployment. This is of course not to say that UI effects are 
irrelevant empirically: rather to the contrary, given that the overwhelming 
majority of unemployment spells will be completed by that time, UI does 
crucially affect unemployment spells and the associated wage outcomes for the 
bulk of the total inflow into unemployment.10 The results for the interactions of 
                                                 
10  Averaging over the 1984-1995 period, some 80% of all unemployment spells among U.S. workers 
lasted six months or less, some 90% of all spells were completed by nine months, and only about 5% 
of all unemployment spells continued for 12 months or more. Longer unemployment durations in 
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benefit effects and spell duration do imply, however, that benefit effects are 
highly unlikely to account for the persistence of unemployment among the long-
term unemployed. Conditional on having spent already one year unemployed, 
there is little evidence of any remaining UI effects on reemployment rates, i.e. 
those long-term unemployed supported by benefits are no less likely to take up 
paid work than those without UI benefits. 
 At the same time as negative UI effects on reemployment rates decline 
over spell duration, it is also true that positive UI effects on wages tend to be 
more pronounced for early job exits out of unemployment. Obviously, UI 
protection cannot provide ultimate guarantees against wage losses after fairly 
long duration of unemployment, and it certainly seems to be the case that 
sustained selective job search does no longer produce favorable job outcomes 
among the long-term unemployed. The parameter estimates in fact also 
suggest stronger duration dependence in positive UI effects on wages as 
compared to duration dependence in UI effects on reemployment rates, i.e. 
positive UI effects on wages decline relatively more quickly than negative UI 
effects on reemployment rates. In conjunction with the earlier finding of some 
negative duration dependence in wage outcomes, this result does suggest the 
necessity for the unemployed to continuously revise job expectations 
downwards during the course of unemployment spells. And if anything, there 
seems to be some evidence that UI benefits indeed slows down this adjustment 
of expectations as UI wage effects indeed decline more quickly than negative UI 
effects on reemployment rates. Against the empirical structure of unemployment 
dynamics, the quantitative impact of this effect is probably minor on the other 
hand. Given that most workers exit unemployment quickly, the cumulative wage 
distributions in any event continue to show clear positive benefit effects among 
both U.S. and German workers. 
 
 Against this evidence that UI effects are unlikely to perpetuate long-term 
unemployment, Figure 2 plots evidence on UI effects across skill groups defined 
by pre-unemployment earnings levels that is quite consistent with UI protecting  
and maintaining workers’ accumulated human capital through unemployment 
spells. In general, UI effects on both reemployment rates and wages increase 
with workers’ pre-unemployment earnings. Thus, both positive and negative UI 
effects occur markedly among high-skill workers, thus clearly supporting the 
search subsidy interpretation of benefit effects, and also stressing the trade-off 
relationship between improved wage outcomes on the one hand and prolonged 
spell duration on the other. According to the results here, it is certainly not the 
case that UI acts as a work disincentive among low-wage earners, yet has the 
search subsidy effect among high-wage workers. Rather, UI effects tend to be 
fairly small among the low-wage group in general. If anything, it seems to be the 
                                                                                                                                               
West Germany are reflected in the fact that only some 60% of all unemployment spells are completed 
within six months, about 70% within nine months, and about 80% within 12 months. 
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case that positive UI effects on wages are particularly pronounced among low- 
to mid-wage workers in West Germany against a relatively small reduction in 
reemployment rates. 
Recall or Benefit Effects? 
There is one final important reservation against the robust evidence of positive 
UI effects on post-unemployment wages obtained here, and about its correct 
theoretical reading in particular. While the evidence of positive UI effects seems 
to be robust econometrically, it is far from clear that these positive effects 
indeed result from the reservation wage mechanism described by search 
models. Rather, recalls might act as an important alternative mechanism to the 
supposed improvement of matching processes achieved by UI. In particular, it 
might be argued that job exits through recalls potentially imply substantial 
positive biases in the UI effect estimates reported before, so that true UI effects 
on matching might be much lower than those reported so far. Ending 
unemployment spells through recalls is indeed quite common in both the United 
States (Katz and Meyer 1990b), but also in the West German labor market 
(Mavromaras and Rudolph 1998). Given that workers’ firm-specific human 
capital is retained, recalls should be associated with relatively positive wage 
outcomes at exiting unemployment. In addition, if employers are more likely to 
consider recalls of more experienced workers who might also have better 
access to UI benefits during unemployment spells, there might be a positive 
correlation between workers’ UI eligibility and workers’ probability of being 
recalled later on. This correlation, in turn, would imply positive biases in 
estimates of UI effects on post-unemployment wages. Hence, any assertions 
that UI benefits are effective in protecting workers’ current stock of human 
capital would want to be tested against the effects of recalls. 
 In contrast to the GSOEP, the SIPP data fortunately provide sufficient 
information to establish whether given job exits have occurred by returning to 
workers’ former employers or by entering job matches with new employers. 
According to the SIPP data, slightly less than 30% of all job exits observed in 
the sample were recalls to workers’ former employers, with some anti-cyclical 
trend in this figure. More importantly, however, the data also do point to a 
positive correlation between UI benefit receipt and the probability of recall: 
among workers receiving unemployment benefits, a full 37.7% of all job exits 
were to workers’ former employers. Among workers without benefits, the 
respective proportion amounted to a mere 24.5% of all job exits. 
 
 Yet do these data imply that positive benefit effects on post-
unemployment wages are mostly a function of recalls, or are the positive wage 
effects of UI due to improving matching processes more generally? To test for 
 20
either possibility, Table 6 contains estimation results for another series of rate 
models that include recall information in the covariate vector.11 Given that the 
full estimation results are substantively quite similar to those presented earlier, 
Table 6 contains only the estimates for the two key institutional covariates of 
interest, the effects of recalls and the effects of unemployment benefits. With 
respect to the former, the results closely conform to the expectations developed 
above: recalls both do raise reemployment rates among unemployed workers, 
and tend to considerably improve post-unemployment wages. In particular, 
recalls show strong effects on limiting the incidence of wage losses upon 
reemployment; if anything, the associated effect sizes even exceed the positive 
UI effects established earlier. Against this background, the estimation results 
also continue to show robust and strong evidence of positive UI effects on 
wages, however. Controlling for the effects of recall, unemployment benefits 
continue to have both an important and statistically significant negative effect on 
reemployment rates and a substantial positive effect on workers’ post-
unemployment wages. Compared to the parameter estimates of Table 3 above, 
controlling for the effects of recalls reduces the size of positive UI effects on 
wages in the order of around 10%. Consequently, the positive UI effects on 
wages do not mainly result from a positive correlation between firm-specific 
skills and UI benefit receipt, but from UI achieving a genuine protection of 
workers’ current stock of human capital. As asserted by Burdett (1979), UI thus 
mainly acts as a search subsidy to workers that results in considerably 
improved job matches among covered workers. 
                                                 
11  As the incidence of recall is of course endogenous to the rate equation, recall effects on reemployment 
rates are controlled by the time-varying control function for the probability of recall. Recall 
predictions are based on a probit model that includes gender, ethnicity, education, labor force 
experience, tenure and earnings with previous employer as well as occupation and industry dummies 
as covariates. The model achieves a Pseudo-R² of 4.7%; full estimation results are available from the 
author. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
In their recent analysis, Addison and Blackburn (2000) perceived their own 
econometric evidence as too weak as to allow a definitive judgment about 
positive effects of unemployment insurance on workers’ post-unemployment 
wages. This does not seem to be the case for the empirical evidence obtained 
in the current paper: to the contrary, the analyses conducted here do obtain 
statistically robust evidence of positive UI effects on wages, which is both 
consistent for both U.S. and West German data and indicative of fairly 
substantial effect sizes. For the U.S. data, at any rate, the estimated UI effects 
suggesting an average increase in post-unemployment wages by 5.3% of 
workers’ pre-unemployment wage levels, are certainly at the upper end of those 
obtained by Addison and Blackburn (2000). Compared to the U.S. data, the 
evidence for West Germany points to even stronger positive effects, however, 
with point estimates in the order of a +9% increase in workers’ post-
unemployment wages. In contrast to Addison and Blackburn (2000), I also 
obtain consistent evidence that UI effects occur more strongly in the lower tail of 
the wage change distribution, and among high-skill workers. 
 In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this paper would strongly 
seem to support the search theory interpretation of UI effects on unemployment 
dynamics. Consistent with many earlier studies, there is evidence of a 
substantial negative UI effect on reemployment rates, yet this effect is 
counterbalanced by equally strong positive UI effects on post-unemployment 
wages. Consistent with Burdett’s (1979) early notion, unemployment insurance 
thus mainly acts as a search subsidy to workers implying relatively more 
favorable job outcomes through sustaining costly job searches for relatively 
more adequate employment. Acting as a credit slip to unemployed workers, 
unemployment insurance might thus be seen as an important institutional 
device for preserving workers’ accumulated human capital through 
unemployment spells. This reading of the evidence is additionally supported by 
the finding that UI particular acts to avoid (severe) wage losses upon 
reemployment rather than generating a more uniform upward shift in the wage 
outcome distribution: very much as implied by basic job search theory, UI raises 
workers’ truncation point of the wage distribution rather than shifting the whole 
distribution upwards. The human capital preservation aspect stressed here is 
also consistent with the fact that more pronounced UI effects have been found 
among high-wage workers. Also, the analyses have stressed that UI indeed 
tends to preserve workers’ general human capital – restoration of firm-specific 
human capital through recalls has been found to leave UI effect estimates 
virtually unaffected, and hence the primary effect of UI apparently is to improve 
actual job matching rather than anything else. 
 As far as it goes, the results obtained here thus emphasize 
unemployment benefit provision as one major institutional means of alleviating, 
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or at least dampening the scar effects of unemployment: unemployment 
benefits do lower the opportunity cost of job search, and hence subsidize 
workers’ job search, and this sustained job search also does show positive 
payoffs in terms of higher wages. Stated as simple as that, the importance of 
unemployment insurance for limiting scar effects might be even undervalued: 
As Arulampalam’s (2001) recent results have pointed out, it is the quality of the 
first post-unemployment job match that is decisive for permanent scar effects of 
unemployment – empirically, workers apparently have considerable difficulties 
in making up for initial bad matches in later careers. Effectively, the current 
analysis has been exclusively confined to wage outcomes in workers’ first post-
unemployment jobs, and substantial effects of UI on precisely this first post-
unemployment match have been documented. Hence, UI might legitimately 
come to be seen as having considerable positive long-run effects on careers, 
but potentially even on the macroeconomy more generally (cf. Acemoglu 2001). 
Certainly, more research to show whether and to which extent initial positive UI 
effects on wages become dissipated or are maintained over time is direly 
needed. However, the magnitudes of the effects established in this analysis 
might even make the positive wage effects that were required to render the 
associated prolongation of unemployment cost-effective surprisingly small. If UI 
is associated with an increase of unemployment duration by 0.5-1 month on 
average, sustaining a 5% gross wage gain for about a single year would be fully 
sufficient to have a self-financed UI search subsidy at the going replacement 
rates in the current U.S. or German UI systems. 
 In addition to these results, there are some apparent differences in UI 
effects between the U.S. and the West German labor market that would seem 
to warrant closer further study. If anything, the empirical results of this paper 
suggest even stronger positive UI effects against smaller negative duration 
effects in West Germany. In any event, the latter effect is fully consistent with 
basic job search theory that stipulates benefit effects to increase in more 
dynamic labor markets. More troubling for the theory, and hence more 
interesting as a research question, is the finding of stronger positive wage 
effects in Germany, and in particular the marked effects at relatively low levels 
of pre-unemployment earnings. Before offering possible conclusions on the 
issue, replications of the finding with different data would certainly be called for. 
If substantiated, one then might assess the reasons behind this finding. While 
there are many possible explanations, it would seem important to control for the 
effects of a fairly effective public employment service in Germany, which could 
both offer a decisive advantage to low- to intermediately skilled workers and 
would certainly be correlated with actual benefit status. Naturally, however, only 
future research will be able to resolve the issue. 
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 I 
Table 1 
Unemployment duration and post-unemployment wage outcomes, 1984-1995 
 United States West Germany 
 all  
workers 
with  
UI 
benefits 
without 
UI 
benefits 
all  
workers 
with  
UI 
benefits 
without 
UI 
benefits 
Median spell duration 
(months) 
2.31 3.37 1.78 4.80 5.10 2.80 
% work exits 0.695 0.739 0.672 0.708 0.712 0.679 
Mean wage change 1.210 1.166 1.236 1.148 1.130 1.356 
Median wage change 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.998 1.088 
Prob(wage loss) 0.449 0.472 0.436 0.498 0.506 0.412 
Prob(wage loss > 10%) 0.344 0.358 0.335 0.310 0.306 0.360 
Prob(wage loss > 20%) 0.257 0.275 0.247 0.232 0.226 0.302 
Prob(wage loss > 30%) 0.197 0.211 0.189 0.177 0.172 0.232 
Prob(wage loss > 50%) 0.123 0.129 0.120 0.078 0.076 0.103 
% workers with UI benefits 0.389   0.892   
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M), weighted data. 
 
 
 
II 
Table 2 
Hazard rate models estimates, U.S. data 
 Job exit rate Wage change 
  Log wage 
change 
Any wage loss Wage loss  
> 10% 
Wage loss  
> 20% 
Wage loss  
> 30% 
Wage loss  
> 50% 
Intercept  -1.763 (.123)**  -2.526 (.156)**  -2.881 (.212)**  -3.344 (.212)**  -3.728 (.228)**  -4.000 (.228)**  4.306 (.267)** 
Unemployment benefits  -0.250 (.013)**  0.208 (.018)**  -0.246 (.025)**  -0.291 (.024)**  -0.282 (.022)**  -0.304 (.022)**  -0.310 (.026)** 
IMR Benefit Status  0.074 (.033)**  0.054 (.041)  -0.177 (.058)**  -0.213 (.059)**  -0.213 (.057)**  -0.201 (.058)**  -0.299 (.070)** 
T  -0.033 (.003)**  0.006 (.005)  0.015 (.011)  0.021 (.008)**  0.016 (.009)*  0.010 (.007)  0.005 (.008) 
T² (x 100)  0.033 (.012)**  0.019 (.026)  -0.127 (.097)  -0.133 (.049)**  -0.135 (.047)**  -0.112 (.044)**  -0.079 (.051) 
T³ (x 10,000)  -0.103 (.078)  -0.311 (.223)  2.350 (2.28)  1.390 (.537)**  1.460 (.557)**  1.260 (.511)**  1.010 (.589)* 
Years of education  0.026 (.003)**  -0.006 (.004)  0.023 (.006)  0.035 (.006)**  0.039 (.006)**  0.039 (.006)**  0.049 (.007)** 
Labor force experience  0.010 (.002)**  -3.7e-4 (.003)  0.002 (.004)  1.2e-4 (.004)  -7.7e-5 (.004)**  0.002 (.004)  -0.003 (.004) 
Labor force experience² (x 100)  -0.027 (.005)**  0.007 (.006)  -0.019 (.009)**  -0.013 (.009)  -0.014 (.009)  -0.016 (.008)*  -0.007 (.010) 
Tenure in previous job  -0.001 ( 3e-4)**  -0.001 ( 4e-4)**  0.001 ( 6e-4)**  0.001 ( 6e-4)  0.001 ( 6e-4)*  0.001 ( 5e-4)**  0.001 ( 6e-4) 
Tenure in previous job² (x 100)  4.6e-5 ( 9e-5)  -3.0e-4 ( 1e-4)**  -3.0e-4 ( 2e-4)  -1.6e-4 ( 2e-4)  -2.4e-4 ( 2e-4)  -4.0e-4 ( 2e-4)**  1.6e-4 ( 2e-4) 
Ln(previous earnings)  0.062 (.012)**  -0.234 (.016)**  0.260 (.024)**  0.267 (.026)**  0.268 (.028)**  0.279 (.026)**  0.296 (.031)** 
Quarterly vacancy ratio  0.042 (.005)**  -0.024 (.007)**  0.026 (.010)**  0.033 (.009)**  0.040 (.029)**  0.032 (.009)**  0.031 (.011)**         
ρ12   -0.744 (.021)**  0.617 (.070)**  0.675 (.071)**  0.805 (.075)**  0.888 (.043)**  0.838 (.059)** 
Log-likelihood  -42,941 -37,874 -37,388 -36,614 -35,774 -34,458 
Log-likelihood null model   -39,222 -38,784 -38,057 -37,237 -35,848 
Notes: N = 69,480 observation months (11,550 observed work exits). Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. As 
additional controls, all models include gender, ethnicity, annual dummies as well as a seam month variable in the rate equation. The rate model estimates 
given are those obtained in the model for any wage losses. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993. 
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Table 3 
Hazard rate models estimates, West German data 
 Job exit rate Wage change 
  Log wage 
change 
Any wage loss Wage loss  
> 10% 
Wage loss  
> 20% 
Wage loss  
> 30% 
Wage loss  
> 50% 
Intercept  -2.436 (.681)**  4.094 (.585)**  -5.629 (1.28)**  -5.334 (1.42)**  -5.023 (1.34)**  -5.489 (1.13)**  -6.540 (1.74)** 
Unemployment benefits  -0.163 (.085)*  0.188 (.071)**  -0.343 (.169)**  -0.560 (.190)**  -0.461 (.181)**  -0.285 (.146)**  -0.374 (.216)* 
IMR Benefit Status  -0.266 (.384)  0.491 (.325)  -1.253 (.895)  -1.671 (1.05)  -1.030 (.978)  -0.315 (.780)  -0.271 (1.26) 
T  -0.034 (.008)**  0.018 (.008)**  0.029 (.034)  0.028 (.029)  0.012 (.026)  -0.003 (.015)  0.020 (.027) 
T² (x 100)  0.049 (.034)  -0.064 (.034)*  -0.193 (.210)  0.007 (.100)  0.030 (.087)  0.024 (.061)  -0.058 (.103) 
T³ (x 10,000)  -0.331 (.340)  0.613 (.342)*  3.500 (3.60)  -0.780 (1.13)  -0.752 (.975)  0.343 (.611)  0.392 (1.02) 
Years of education  0.028 (.014)**  0.013 (.010)  -0.014 (.023)  0.003 (.025)  0.008 (.023)  0.013 (.020)  0.008 (.029) 
Vocational training  0.050 (.047)  -0.053 (.037)  0.037 (.089)  0.015 (.099)  0.030 (.093)  -0.003 (.076)  -0.047 (.123) 
Labor force experience  0.006 (.008)  0.010 (.008)  -0.030 (.021)  -0.030 (.023)  -0.017 (.022)  0.007 (.018)  0.015 (.029) 
Labor force experience² (x 100)  -0.059 (.018)**  -0.002 (.018)  0.046 (.050)  0.046 (.055)  0.009 (.052)  -0.059 (.040)  -0.080 (.070) 
Tenure in previous job  -0.004 (.001)**  0.002 ( 7e-4)**  0.002 (.002)  -0.003 (.002)*  -0.002 (.002)  -0.004 (.002)**  -0.001 (.005) 
Tenure in previous job² (x 100)  5.5e-4 ( 2e-4)**  -3.8e-4 ( 2e-4)**  1.4e-4 ( 5e-4)  -4.7e-4 ( 6e-4)  5.3e-4 (.001)  -1.8e-4 ( 8e-4)  -0.003 (.004) 
Ln(previous earnings)  0.088 (.080)  -0.463 (.067)**  0.682 (.159)**  0.588 (.169)**  0.465 (.158)**  0.426 (.135)**  0.501 (.202)** 
Quarterly vacancy ratio  0.634 (.078)**  -0.247 (.071)**  0.227 (.187)**  0.331 (.202)*  0.327 (.200)*  0.513 (.140)**  0.650 (.224)**         
ρ12   -0.910 (.022)**  0.702 (.173)**  0.658 (.228)**  0.785 (.208)**  1.000 ( 3e-6)**  0.910 (.154)** 
Log-likelihood  -2,707 -2,873 -2,816 -2,766 -2,707 -2,578 
Log-likelihood null model   -3,307 -3,251 -3,190 -3,130 -2,987 
Notes: N = 15,665 observation months (690 observed work exits). Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. As 
additional controls, all models include gender, ethnicity, annual dummies as well as a seam month variable in the rate equation. The rate model estimates 
given are those obtained in the model for any wage losses. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M). 
IV 
Table 4 
Estimated marginal benefit effects, by spell duration 
T (months) 1 3 6 12 
 United States 
∆ rW(t) -0.067 (-29.6) -0.063 (-30.5) -0.058 (-31.6) -0.049 (-33.8) 
∆ FW(t) -0.067 (-29.6) -0.130 (-25.0) -0.146 (-19.5) -0.113 (-12.4) 
∆ wage change | work exit +0.061  (+6.7) +0.060  (+6.6) +0.057  (+6.4) +0.053   (-6.0) 
∆ Pr(wage loss | work exit) -0.055 (-12.0) -0.055 (-11.6) -0.053 (-11.1) -0.050 (-10.2) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 10% | work exit) -0.067 (-18.7) -0.067 (-18.1) -0.066 (-17.3) -0.063 (-15.9) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 20% | work exit) -0.053 (-19.3) -0.054 (-18.6) -0.053 (-17.7) -0.050 (-16.2) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 30% | work exit) -0.053 (-24.2) -0.054 (-23.6) -0.054 (-22.6) -0.052 (-21.0) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 50% | work exit) -0.041 (-28.2) -0.042 (-27.6) -0.042 (-26.9) -0.041 (-25.6) 
 West Germany 
∆ rW(t) -0.027 (-23.2) -0.025 (-23.8) -0.023 (-24.6) -0.018 (-26.0) 
∆ FW(t) -0.027 (-23.2) -0.064 (-21.4) -0.092 (-19.1) -0.108 (-15.8) 
∆ wage change | work exit +0.095 (+10.3) +0.095 (+10.3) +0.094 (+10.3) +0.093 (+10.1) 
∆ Pr(wage loss | work exit) -0.113 (-20.7) -0.112 (-20.0) -0.111 (-19.1) -0.108 (-17.9) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 10% | work exit) -0.186 (-45.7) -0.189 (-44.6) -0.193 (-43.0) -0.194 (-40.2) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 20% | work exit) -0.126 (-47.5) -0.131 (-46.7) -0.135 (-45.6) -0.140 (-43.2) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 30% | work exit) -0.052 (-34.0) -0.054 (-33.7) -0.057 (-33.2) -0.060 (-32.1) 
∆ Pr(wage loss > 50% | work exit) -0.032 (-52.4) -0.034 (-51.8) -0.038 (-50.9) -0.043 (-48.9) 
     
Notes: Average discrete-change effects of UI benefit status on unemployment dynamics in the 
estimation samples; proportional marginal change effects in parantheses; weighted data. 
 
 
 
 V 
Table 5 
Hazard rate model estimates, models including benefit interaction terms 
 Job exit rate Wage change 
  Log wage 
change 
Any wage loss Wage loss > 
20% 
     
 United States 
Unemployment benefits     
x spell duration  0.022 (.003)**  -0.023 (.004)**  0.033 (.006)**  0.035 (.006)** 
x log previous earnings  -0.087 (.015)**  0.045 (.020)**  -0.098 (.029)**  -0.128 (.029)** 
     
Log-likelihood  -42,880 -37,810 -36,546 
LR-Test χ² (df) against 
baseline 
  122 (4)**  128 (4)**  136 (4)** 
     
 West Germany 
Unemployment benefits     
x spell duration  0.040 (.021)**  -0.015 (.022)  0.081 (.058)  0.078 (.057) 
x log previous earnings  -0.195 (.137)  0.010 (.120)  -0.105 (.370)  0.073 (.349) 
     
Log-likelihood  -2,703 -2,868 -2,761 
LR-Test χ² (df) against 
baseline 
    8.9 (4)*    9.9 (4)**   10.0 (4)** 
     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. Apart 
from the interaction effects shown, covariate vectors are identical to those given in Table 2 and 
3. The rate model estimates given are those obtained in the model for any wage losses. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M). 
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Figure 1 
Marginal benefit effects by spell duration, any wage loss model 
 
 
Notes: Marginal benefit effect calculations based on augmented hazard models given in Table 5. 
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Figure 2 
Marginal benefit effects in first spell months by previous earnings, any wage loss model 
 
 
Notes: Marginal benefit effect calculations based on augmented hazard models given in Table 5.  
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Table 6 
Benefit effects and recalls, U.S. estimates 
 Unemployment Benefits Recall1) 
 b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 
     
Job exit rate -0.247 (.013)** 0.253 (.047)** 
Job quality     
- wage change 0.197 (.018)** 0.091 (.016)** 
- any wage losses -0.185 (.030)** -0.460 (.032)** 
- wage losses > 10% -0.236 (.030)** -0.494 (.034)** 
- wage losses > 20% -0.228 (.031)** -0.478 (.038)** 
- wage losses > 30% -0.275 (.029)** -0.376 (.041)** 
- wage losses > 50% -0.282 (.034)** -0.281 (.040)** 
     
Notes: N = 69,480 observation months (11,550 observed work exits). Standard errors in parentheses; 
statistical significance levels given at **p<.05, and *p<.10. As additional controls, all models 
include gender, ethnicity, annual dummies as well as a seam month variable in the rate equation. 
The rate model estimates given are those obtained in the model for any wage losses. 1) IV 
estimate in the rate equation. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary statistics for the estimation samples, spell data 
 United States West Germany 
 All 
workers 
with UI 
benefits 
without  
UI benefits 
All 
workers 
with UI 
benefits 
without  
UI benefits 
Women 0.400 
(0.490) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
0.422 
(0.494) 
0.385 
(0.487) 
0.382 
(0.486) 
0.412 
(0.493) 
Non-white / Non-
German 
0.184 
(0.387) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
0.189 
(0.391) 
0.118 
(0.322) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
Age 33.05 
(11.68) 
36.96 
(11.23) 
30.35 
(11.11) 
34.99 
(12.21) 
35.62 
(12.32) 
29.75 
(9.84) 
Years of education 12.52 
(1.89) 
12.60 
(1.88) 
12.45 
(1.90) 
10.85 
(2.12) 
10.82 
(2.07) 
11.11 
(2.56) 
Vocational training - - - 0.607 
(0.489) 
0.628 
(0.484) 
0.435 
(0.496) 
Labor force experience 
(years) 
12.76 
(11.31) 
16.60 
(11.38) 
10.32 
(10.56) 
16.02 
(12.38) 
16.82 
(12.48) 
9.43 
(9.26) 
Tenure in previous job 
(months) 
20.56 
(52.51) 
32.79 
(65.93) 
12.78 
(39.86) 
51.38 
(93.25) 
54.25 
(95.87) 
27.67 
(63.06) 
Earnings in previous job 
(1990 US-$, PPP-
adjusted) 
1141.05 
(1131.41) 
1510.13 
(1280.90) 
906.54 
(953.69) 
1554.83 
(758.69) 
1585.90 
(731.61) 
1279.54 
(922.96) 
Vacancy ratio 
(quarterly) 
3.072 
(1.924) 
2.966 
(1.874) 
3.140 
(1.953) 
0.794 
(0.247) 
0.796 
(0.246) 
0.760 
(0.204) 
Unemployment benefits 0.389 
(0.487) 
  0.892 
(0.317) 
  
       
N spells (unweighted) 24,100 8,941 15,159 3,251 2,856 395 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993;  
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M); weighted data. 
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Appendix 2 
UI benefit coverage in the United States and West Germany, probit models 
 United States West Germany 
Intercept  -4.194 (.052)*  -3.983 (.204)* 
Tenure in previous job  0.008 ( 3e-4)*  0.004 (.001)* 
Tenure²  -4.3e-4 ( 3e-6)*  -1.5e-5 ( 6e-6)* 
Tenure³  6.0e-8 ( 5e-9)*  1.7e-8 ( 1e-8)* 
Ln(Previous Earnings)  0.420 (.006)*  0.636 (.028)* 
Women  -0.063 (.046)  0.088 (.109) 
Non-White/German  -0.250 (.012)*  0.070 (.030)* 
Age  0.121 (.005)*  0.053 (.017)* 
Age²  -0.005 ( 3e-4)*  -0.003 (.001)* 
Age³  5.3e-5 ( 4e-6)*  4.4e-5 ( 1e-5)* 
Women x Age  0.008 (.008)  0.022 (.023) 
Women x Age²  -3.9e-4 ( 4e-4)  -0.001 (.001) 
Women x Age³  8.0e-6 ( 6e-6)  2.1e-5 ( 2e-5) 
Education   
- High School / Vocational Training  0.099 (.012)*  0.065 (.031)* 
- Some College / Abitur  0.073 (.014)*  0.056 (.077) 
- Bachelor's degree  -0.089 (.019)* - 
- Master's degree / University  -0.333 (.026)*  -0.355 (.065)* 
Labor Force Experience  0.022 (.002)*  0.050 (.006)* 
Labor Force Experience²  -3.2e-4 ( 4e-5)*  -0.001 ( 1e-4)* 
Log-likelihood -49,360 -5,267 
LR-Test (df) 20,821 (32)* 2,419 (31)* 
Pseudo R² 0.174 0.187 
N 86,915 27,135 
Notes:  Standard errors in parantheses; statistical significance at *p<.05. The models include seasonal 
and year dummies as additional controls. 
Source:  Survey of Income and Program Participation, Panels 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1993; 
German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984-1995 data (Waves A-M). 
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